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Abstract. The efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance theory have been the cornerstone 
of modern asset pricing for the past 50 odd years. Although both theories are fundamental in 
explaining modern asset pricing, they are opposing views. The efficient market hypothesis dictates 
that the price of any asset depends on the information, while the behavioural finance theory dictates 
that the price depends on the reaction of the market participants to the information. Therein lays the 
key to the argument influencing modern asset pricing, does price immediately reflect the information 
or market participants‟ perception of the information. In this paper, we will critical evaluate the 
theory influencing the efficient market hypothesis. We will review the neoclassical economics 
underpinning the efficient market hypothesis and the recent empirical evidence. In concluding, we 
find that although the efficient market hypothesis has difficulties in testing and the empirical evidence 
is mixed. Yet it is useful as a benchmark for regulators and central bankers alike. However, market 
participants are homo sapiens and not homo economics; hence there is a requirement to understand 
their reaction. So in essence leading to a requirement to include the behavioural finance theory, if we 
are to understand asset pricing.  
Keywords. Efficient market hypothesis, Behavioural finance theory, Neoclassical economics 
JEL. B13, G02, G03, G12, G14. 
 
1. Introduction 
he dominant asset pricing theory since the early to mid-1960s have been the 
efficient market hypothesis, developed through the contributions of 
prominence articles such as Malkiel (1962), Fama (1965) and Malkiel & 
Fama (1970). As proposed by Malkiel (1962) and Fama (1965), the efficient 
market hypothesis argues that the price of any asset must immediately reflect 
fundamental information about the asset. However, to a certain degree the efficient 
market hypothesis relies on some untestable assumptions and models. Yet it is 
possible to test the key assumptions of random walk and efficiency individually 
thru the use of prominent tests like the variance ratio and bound tests proposed by 
Lo & MacKinlay (1989) and Shiller (1981) respectively. 
At the basic level, the efficient market hypothesis is the perfect competition, 
which is widely used in neoclassical economics. Perfect competition implies the 
assumption that market participants are rational, risk averse and profit maximising. 
This assumption of market participants‟ behaviour extends to the efficient market 
hypothesis, as proposed by Fama (1965) and Malkiel (1962). This highlights the 
needs to evaluate the assumptions influencing the behaviour of market participants 
under uncertainty before we can research the efficient market hypothesis. 
The paper will open with a brief overview of the fundamental economic 
paradigm underpinning the efficient market hypothesis, namely neoclassical 
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economics. This will be followed by an in depth review of the efficient market 
hypothesis before concluding. 
 
2. Neoclassical Economics  
Historically, neoclassical economics have been the dominant view in explaining 
the behaviour of financial markets under uncertainty. In essence, this view dictates 
that rational market participants should follow the key assumptions of profit 
maximization, Friedman (1953) and Alchian (1950), and risk aversion, Pratt & 
Zeckhauser (1987) and Kimball (1993), in their choice of investment. The key in 
understanding this argument is the negative correlation effect that the assumptions 
of profit maximization and risk aversion have on financial asset prices. This view 
has been criticised by many including proponents of the theory of behavioural 
finance such as Freeman et al. (2004) and Kourtidis et al. (2011). The key problem 
is the assumptions underpinning the view, are unrealistic, for example rational 
agents as explained by De Bondt et al. (2008) and stockholder theory as argued by 
Philips (1997). In this section, we critically review the neoclassical view 
concentrating on the arguments influencing the assumptions of profit maximization 
and risk aversion. 
However, since financial institutions with stockholders, dominate the sovereign 
debt market; it is necessary to discuss the stockholder theory. The stockholder 
theory dictates that businesses only exist to maximize the stockholders‟ wealth 
within the rule of the law; and as Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) hints this 
means the realization of profits; put simply as Alchian (1950, p. 213) states: 
“This is the criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those 
who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses 
disappear.” 
This is also argued by Friedman (1953, p. 22)  
“Whenever the determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with 
rational and informed maximization of returns, the business will prosper and 
acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the business 
will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition 
of resources from outside.” 
However, as many proponents of the stakeholder theory (such as Freeman et al. 
2004; Philips et al., 2003; Philips, 1997 and Hosseini & Brenner, 1992) would 
point out there is more to business ethics than just profits. The idea as defined by 
Jensen (2002) is that businesses have to take into account the interests of all 
stakeholders in the firm. By definition stakeholders includes all individuals and 
groups who can affect the welfare of the business and not just shareholders. 
However, Friedman (1970) argues that the only social responsibility for a business 
is to increase its profit. 
This seems to be suggesting that as dictated by the market selection hypothesis 
in order for the financial institutions to survive, there is a need to attract investment 
funds and thus generate huge profits as hinted by Dutta & Radner (1999). The 
problem is that the behaviour of many of these financial institutions during the 
assert price boom of the mid 2000s points towards pure profit maximization. As 
defined by De Scitovszky (1943), pure profit maximization is the constant shifting 
of profit targets to maximize the utility function of the shareholders. In contrast, the 
key argument of Alchian (1950) and Tintner (1941) is that businesses just have to 
make a positive profit to survive. The key point is, if they make losses they 
struggle to survive as hinted by many including Alchian (1950) and Friedman 
(1953). A point in case is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and hence the 
government bailout of many financial institutions during the financial crisis. 
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In a way this led to the accusations by many including government inquiries
2
 
into the crises of financial institutions being too risk loving and greedy. However, 
the point defined by Kimball (1993), standard risk aversion follows a marginal 
increasing function, which means that bearing one risk makes the market 
participant less willing to bear another risk. Another argument highlighting this is 
that increasing risk leads to an upward shift in risk aversion as noted by Diamond 
& Stiglitz (1974). This seems to be the overwhelming behaviour during the recent 
financial and sovereign debt crises. A counter argument is that market participants‟ 
behaviour seems to be following proper risk aversion. As defined by Pratt & 
Zeckhauser (1987), proper risk aversion dictates that with respect to two 
independent risks, the rejection of one risk does not automatically deflect the 
market participants from taking the other independent risk. This is mainly due to 
market participants hedging their risks by the use of derivatives instruments such as 
options and futures. An example is the use of credit default swaps as hedges 
against the risk of a government defaulting on its debts. However, a key point made 
in Alchian (1950) definition above is that companies that make losses do not 
survive and this highlights an alternative argument that many market participants 
display loss aversion rather than risk aversion. As defined by Kahneman et al. 
(1991) and Thaler et al. (1997), loss aversion dictates that market participants tend 
to be increasingly sensitive to a loss than to a gain or put simply the feedback 
effect. This is obvious from the reaction of the financial institutions during the 
sovereign debt crises where a loss made the institutions averse to any further 
losses. This meant that the crises quickly spread from Greece to other sovereign 
debt markets. 
This leads us to the utility functions of the agents, since these agents caused the 
problems as often cited by government inquiries into the crises (see footnote 4). 
Given an option between a number of similarly risky investments, utility 
maximization theories dictate that the agent choses the one with the highest 
income. However, in a situation where the agents of financial institutions face 
investments of different risks, the key question is how can they choose the 
investment, which maximizes their utility? This problem occurs if interest rates are 
low and banks therefore take on larger risks for a higher return. This has resulted in 
the development of a sub-prime mortgage market, for example, where prices no 
longer reflect the risks, which ultimately led to the collapse of the market. The 
collapse occurred despite the existence of derivatives instruments such as CDS to 
insure against that risk. Surely, this would conflict with the utility maximization 
behaviour of buying risky securities such as subprime mortgage securities. Still, 
this behaviour can be justified as rational, when one takes into account an S-shaped 
utility curve. Friedman & Savage (1948) and Hartley & Farrell (2002) argue the 
possibility of non-concave or non-diminishing marginal utility function leads to 
different behaviour towards risk. This could explain the rational behaviour of the 
huge gamble taken by the agents during the recent housing and mortgage backed 
securities prices bubble. So in essence, the argument is that even efficient markets 
can lead to market instabilities. As the crisis has shown, however, many market 
participants did not actually know what they were buying as illustrated by (Beltran 
& Thomas, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2008). Therefore, the validity of 
this argument is questionable in the least. 
However, as argued by Pennings & Smidts (2003) the evidence points towards 
an S-shaped utility function curve governed by the agent‟s attitude towards profit 
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and loss, in other words, the shape of the utility function depends on the initial 
situation, which is not compatible with rational behaviour. As this makes the utility 
function unstable resulting in higher volatility of observed bond prices, as buying 
and selling of bonds depended on the changing utility function. So in essence, the 
argument is that even efficient markets can lead to market instabilities. 
The utility function of the agents in the financial sector dictates the supply and 
demand model is the reverse of the standard model as suggested by Cifuentes et al. 
(2005) and Shin (2008). And as hinted by Shin (2008), this means under profit 
maximization behaviour demand in high return assets increase putting upward 
pressures on the equilibrium price, while risk aversion behaviour not only reverses 
the demand for high return assets, due to the high risk associated with these assets, 
but also increases supply leading to a decrease in the equilibrium price. The 
sovereign debt crises elegantly illustrated this, in the high demand environment of 
the flight to liquidity or quality during the financial crises; governments were able 
to control the increase of demand by issuing more debt. During the sovereign debt 
crises demand for several sovereign debts decreased hugely but the point here is, 
the supply also increased putting huge downward pressures on the prices. The 
reasons are simple unlike the standard model of supply and demand which dictates 
when prices go down the issuer could reduce the supply to ease the pressures on 
the equilibrium price. The existence of a secondary market meant that as market 
participants became increasingly risk averse due to a high possibility of defaults, 
they sold the debts meaning the secondary market became overstocked and the 
prices plummeted. So no matter what the governments of the GIPS nations or the 
Eurozone tried to do, they could not reduce the supply and hence the yield. 
As hinted previously, an argument often used against the neoclassical 
economics is that market participants are not all rational as suggested by Hong & 
Stein (1999) and Kourtidis et al. (2011). In addition, unlike the assumption 
dictating that the impact on the prices from irrational market participants is short-
lived, the evidence from Barberis & Thaler (2003) is that the impact is long-lived. 
The other issue concerning neoclassical economics is that the basis for many of the 
simplifying assumption of the models is that all market participants exhibit rational 
risk averse profit maximisation behaviour. As with the previous argument, the 
existence of heterogeneous market participants each with a different attitude to 
risks and earnings means that this assumption of homogeneous behaviour regarding 
risks and earnings does not hold. In this case, we need to use behavioural finance 
theories to identify the impact of heterogeneous market participants in different 
circumstances as illustrated by Hong & Stein (1999). 
 
3. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Before we can start reviewing the efficient market hypothesis, there is a need to 
define information in the context of this research. Although as hinted by Malkiel & 
Fama (1970) and Malkiel (2003), the efficient market hypothesis dictates that 
prices should reflect all available information (which is why we use prices rather 
than spreads to check for market efficiency in this thesis). It is common practice to 
distinguish information in terms of fundamental and non-fundamental information 
(Bollerslev & Hodrick, 1992). In other words, information is the summation: 
 the fundamentals, such as yields or macroeconomic factors in the sovereign 
debt market, as hinted by Cochrane (1991) and Malkiel (2003), 
 non-fundamentals, such as information from news (i.e. they do not have 
any direct relationship to the asset but still have the power to influence the price 
such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008 and 
Japanese Earthquake in 2011), as hinted by Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2008). 
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Malkiel & Fama (1970) notes simply put the efficient market is a market where 
market participants are assumed to exhibit rational profit maximization behaviour 
and prices always fully reflect available information. In essence, as Malkiel (2003) 
states the view influencing the efficient market hypothesis is information spreads 
quickly and priced into asset valuation immediately. Hence, as Malkiel (2005) 
states this means that no arbitrage opportunities exist that allows for excess returns 
without excess risks. As Malkiel (2003) hints in an efficient market, competition 
will mean that opportunities for excessive risk adjusted returns will not persist. 
However, this does not mean that the efficient market hypothesis imply market 
prices will always be accurate and all market participants will always exhibit 
rational profit maximization behaviour. 
According to Malkiel & Fama (1970), the efficient market hypothesis dictates 
that any model of expected price should follow the notation of 𝐸  𝑝 𝑗 ,𝑡+1 𝜙𝑡 =
 1 + 𝐸  𝑟 𝑗 ,𝑡+1 𝜙𝑡  𝑝𝑗𝑡 . The importance of this equation in the concept of this 
research is 𝜙𝑡 . According to Malkiel & Fama (1970), this suggests that the 
expected price based on all available information at present is the price at present 
plus the expected return based on all available information at present. As Malkiel 
& Fama (1970), states this notation of the expected price, means regardless of 
which model (e.g. APT or CAPM) used to derive the equilibrium price, expected 
return should fully reflect all information available at present, transaction costs and 
taxations being equal. Remember, as noted by Malkiel & Fama (1970), where 
expected excess value or return on the asset is equal to zero then by definition the 
excess value or return is a fair game with respect to the information available. In 
essence as quoted by Malkiel (1962), the expectation of the future price of the asset 
strongly influences the price of any long-lived asset. However, as put by Malkiel 
(1962), it is plausible that the recent past dictates the market participants‟ 
expectations. 
As suggested by both Fama (1965) and Malkiel (2003), the efficient market 
hypothesis is associated with the idea influencing the random walk model. A big 
issue with regard to the pricing of information, as seen in numerous events during 
the recent financial and sovereign debt crises, is nobody can predict the impact of 
information especially under uncertainty. Hence, as Fama (1965) states during 
periods of uncertainty the equilibrium price can never be determined exactly. 
Moreover, as hinted by Fama (1965) the instantaneous adjustment property of the 
efficient market hypothesis may cause successive independent price changes, 
which imply prices follow the random walk model. As defined by Malkiel (2003, 
p. 59) 
“The logic of the random walk idea is that if the flow of information is 
unimpeded and information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then 
tomorrow's price change will reflect only tomorrow's news and will be 
independent of the price changes today.” 
Although, as stated by Malkiel & Fama (1970), the random walk model does 
not state that past information has no value in assessing distribution of future 
returns. However, the random walk model does state that the sequencing of past 
returns has no value in assessing distribution of future returns. This last statement 
could infer the random walk model simply put is the direction in the short run of 
expected returns and hence prices is unpredictable given all available information; 
however, in the long run the trend in the market prices is partially predictable as 
stated by Malkiel (2005). Furthermore, as stated by Timmermann & Granger 
(2004), this makes the efficient market hypothesis notoriously difficult to forecast 
prices and returns. The key logic behind this is if prices and returns were 
forecastable, it would mean the existence of unlimited profit, which would make 
the economy unstable as noted by Timmermann & Granger (2004). 
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As hinted by Ball (2009), many in the regulatory, financial markets and 
academic environments were critical of the efficient market hypothesis in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. The reasoning behind their argument boils down to 
the key notation underpinning the efficient market hypothesis that market prices 
should reflect all available information. This led to the false sense of security by 
regulators and market participants that market prices were correct based on all 
information leading to an asset price bubble. Ball (2009) argues that while like all 
good theories the efficient market hypothesis does have major limitations; 
however, appear to exaggerate the criticisms in the aftermath of the global financial 
crises. Since the theory of the efficient market hypothesis was only published by 
Fama (1965), this argument is invalid since there have been many crises based on 
the asset price bubble before the advent of the efficient market hypothesis. Ball 
(2009) points to the fact that the efficient market hypothesis states current asset 
prices are correct based on all available information; this means that market 
participants should accept asset prices as correct. However, in the pre-crises asset 
price bubble many market participants thought that asset prices were “incorrect” 
and hence they could beat the market. This does seem to suggest that for some 
market efficiency based on all information the price is right/correct. However, this 
is misleading, since the efficient market hypothesis, as defined by Malkiel & Fama 
(1970), does not state that the price is right/correct; it only states the price should 
reflect all available information. 
A key argument often put against the efficient market hypothesis is that 
sometimes asset prices deviate from the fundamental value as hinted by many 
including Barberis & Thaler (2003) and De Bondt et al. (2008). In addition, as 
illustrated by Barberis & Thaler (2003) these deviations can be long-lived and 
substantial. Another issue raised by Hong & Stein (1999) is that market 
participants may not have access to all the information. And even if they do, as 
suggested by De Bondt (2000) and Daniel et al. (1998) they may have different 
sentiment about the information. 
A key assumption used in the efficient market hypothesis is the existence of 
well-informed wealthy rational arbitrageurs who push the asset price back to its 
fundamental value (Fama, 1965). As Hong & Stein (1999) illustrate the existence 
of these arbitrageurs does not counter the effect of other market participants and 
Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003) argue that these arbitrageurs sometime like to take 
advantage of the circumstances therefore pushing the price further from the 
fundamental value. 
Another key argument is that markets often go thru phrases where the efficient 
market hypothesis is not enough to explain the anomalies, e.g. bubbles (see 
Blanchard & Watson, 1982; Hong & Stein, 1999; De Bondt, 2000; Abreu & 
Brunnermeier, 2003). Hence, there is a need to research the psychology of market 
participants as suggested by De Bondt et al. (2008) and Kourtidis et al. (2011). 
This leads towards the use of the behavioural finance theory. 
The evidence seems to suggest there is a link between the pricing of information 
and sovereign debt markets and as Brandt & Kavajecz (2004) hints there are two 
main mechanisms for the daily changes in yields on sovereign debts: flow of public 
information and price discovery. However, as illustrated by the numerous empirical 
studies, the majority of the evidence is on the effect of macroeconomic information 
and the heterogeneous interpretation, known as price discovery, or public 
information. Christiansen (2000) argues that contrary to equity and corporate bond, 
in general there is no private information in sovereign debts returns. Thus, 
generally any movement in the returns on sovereign debts must come from public 
information, i.e. macroeconomic announcements and since the time varying return 
volatility of financial assets are autocorrelated and highly persistent, hence 
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macroeconomic announcements could explain the high persistent observed in the 
volatility of sovereign debt markets. However, according to Greenwood & 
Vayanos (2010), macroeconomic variables sometimes cannot fully explain the 
variation in the yield curve and hence shifts in demand and/or supply of sovereign 
debts are other important drivers in understanding the movements in the yield 
curve. 
According to Fleming & Remolona (1999), the key implications stemming from 
how public information influences the US Treasury market is the extent to which it 
drives the price movement and market makers are not confronted by imperfect 
information when trading. As implied by the article unlike many other financial 
markets, the treasury market being dominated by non-market based trading hence it 
is restricted by maximum or minimum limits on bid-ask spreads or price changes, 
therefore spreads and prices can adjust endogenously on public information. They 
identify two stages in the market‟s adjustment for price formation and liquidity 
provision in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of public information: 
during the brief first stage, there is a sharp and instantaneous change in prices and a 
reduction in the trading volume. During the next stage persistence trading surges 
leads to high price volatility and moderately wide bid-ask spreads. 
Bollerslev et al. (2000) analysed the 5 min intraday US Treasury bond futures 
data over the period January 1994 to December 1997; researching long-memory 
volatility in macroeconomic announcements in the observed data. They found that 
US Treasuries futures exhibit long memory volatility in certain macroeconomic 
announcements. According to their research, the open and close of markets have 
higher volatilities than mid-day. The results indicate macroeconomic 
announcement is a key source of US Treasuries market volatility compared with 
prior results for FX and equity markets. 
In an empirical study by Balduzzi et al. (2001) on the effect of regular 
macroeconomics news on a number of US Treasuries, the study found the greater 
the unexpected macroeconomic news announcement is, the more significant the 
impact on the price of at least one of the US Treasuries. They found that generally 
the price is usually the first affected by the announcement hinting that public 
information mainly drives the initial price adjustment. The next stage is the 
widening of the bid-ask spread suggesting informed trading drives both volatility 
and volume. The final stage is the continuation of the volatility and volume beyond 
the normality of the bid-ask spread hinting at liquidity trading. According to the 
article, different macroeconomic factors have different effects on the various 
securities. However, several announcements have significant impact on a number 
of securities and the impact varies depending on the maturity. They conclude that 
surprises in the announcement have a substantial impact on the price volatility but 
the bid-ask spreads seem to recover quickly hinting at public information being 
rapidly absorbed into the price. 
In another empirical study by Brandt & Kavajecz (2004); show that price 
discovery is not necessarily concentrated around the time of the public information 
announcement. They imply at the existence of many factors influencing changes in 
the daily yield and therefore the structure of the yield curve but highlight two main 
complimentary factors: public information flow, such as periodically 
macroeconomic information releases, and heterogeneous interpretation of public 
information, i.e. price discovery, via trading in the Treasury market. 
Interestingly, the Andersson et al. (2006) study of the effect of macroeconomic 
news from various countries on price discovery in the German long-term 
government bonds market finds that in general macroeconomic news have a 
stronger longer-lasting impact on volatility. In addition, they found that 
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macroeconomic news from the US have more influence than the Eurozone 
announcements or various countries within the Eurozone. 
An important aspect of market participants‟ behaviour as hinted by Caballero & 
Krishnamurthy (2008) is market participants face immeasurable systemic risks 
under certain market conditions, which lead to market participants exhibiting flight 
to quality or liquidity behaviour. Acknowledged as Knightian Uncertainty, it is 
believed to explain the behaviour of market participants in the aftermath of a wide 
range of events such as the Lehman Brothers Collapse in September 2008, Greek 
sovereign debt crisis and 9/11 terrorist attacks. The common factor is the lack of 
previous similar events to base information on. However, these events are based on 
news and hence as hinted by Malkiel (2003) news is by definition unpredictable 
resulting in price changes tending towards unpredictability and hence randomness. 
In general, there is a large body of empirical literatures on the efficiency of the 
financial market. A large percentage of these are based on the stock market, the 
recent evidence on the efficiency of the stock market is mixed. Some found the 
stock market to be inefficient; an example is Cajueiro et al. (2009) who found the 
liberalization of the Greek stock market made it significantly less efficient. 
However, the evidence from Cuthbertson & Hyde (2002) seem to suggest the 
acceptance of the EMH for the French stock market and slightly less so for the 
German.  
In comparison, the body of empirical literatures on the efficiency of the 
sovereign debt market is limited despite the first model of international efficient 
market being based on the French sovereign debt market as stated by Zunino et al. 
(2012). As Zunino et al. (2012) suggest the main reasons are the size of trading on 
the stock market and the type of trading for the sovereign debt market, mainly 
traded “over-the-counter”. Like the stock market, the recent empirical evidence on 
efficiency in the sovereign debt market is mixed. Zunino et al. (2012) using 
sovereign debt indices found that developed markets tend to be more efficient than 
emerging markets.  
Fakhry & Richter (2015) studying the impact of the recent financial and 
sovereign debt crises on the US and German sovereign debt markets found in 
general both markets were too volatile to be efficient. Although the US datasets do 
suggest the market is efficient, is efficient, yet the subsamples suggest a mixed 
results pointing to both crises having an impact on the efficiency of the US and 
German markets. Conversely, Fakhry et al. (2016) extending the method used in 
Fakhry & Richter (2015) to the GIPS markets, also find mixed evidence of 
efficiency during the crises. This leads to a possible explanation of the efficiency of 
the US datasets using the behavioural finance theory. Since market participants 
were overreacting/underreacting to information during different periods, one 
possible conclusion is that the overreaction/underreaction cancel each other out 
leading to a stable state in the datasets giving the impression of market efficiency. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The efficient market hypothesis has been the mainstream of finance for nearly 
50 years. However, as highlighted in the review, there are many issues with this 
theory and it does throw up a basic flawed idea. The concept is that the price 
always incorporates all the information at the time and hence the price reflects the 
given information. This idea is at the centre of the debate surrounding the efficient 
market hypothesis in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The other key issue is 
that it relies on key assumptions made in neoclassical economics, which do not 
always hold in the real world, i.e. the existence of rational market participants and 
perfectly competitive markets. In truth, both the efficient market hypothesis and 
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neoclassical economics view are essentially just models of the financial market and 
are therefore best used as benchmarks and not observations of the real world. A 
key factor to note is that market participants are homo sapiens and not homo 
economics.  
Another issue as highlighted by Ball (2009), many were critical of the efficient 
market hypothesis in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The issue seems to be 
based around the price is correct argument, however this is dangerously 
misleading; since the efficient market hypothesis only states the price should 
reflect all available information at the time. There are two arguments regarding this 
issue; firstly, as highlighted by Ball (2009) in the pre-crisis period many market 
participants thought prices were incorrect and using sophisticated forecasting 
models, they could beat the market. Secondly, the efficient market hypothesis does 
not work when there is unequalled access to information resulting in incomplete or 
asymmetrical information. This goes back to the neoclassical economics 
assumption of perfect competition; in a perfectly competitive environment, 
information should be complete and accessible to all market participants. 
Of course, a key neoclassical economics assumption is that market participants 
are risk averse. However, as hinted by Buiter (2007) and Feldstein (2007), as early 
as 2005 many thought there was massive under-pricing of risks. Hence, market 
participants were not following this fundamental assumption of neoclassical 
economics and thus the efficient market hypothesis. This goes to the heart of the 
problem during any asset price bubble, as illustrated in the next section, it is often 
the case that market participants usually think they could beat the market and 
therefore consistently under-price risk in the attempt of making increasingly large 
profits. Therefore, distorting the market from the fundamental price leading to 
increased asymmetrical information. 
The key is determining whether the financial market accept the efficient market 
hypothesis, we presented strong historical empirical evidence suggesting financial 
markets are not efficient. The tests and methods used to test the efficiency of the 
markets in the empirical evidences are wide ranging, e.g. variance bound tests 
(Shiller, 1979), variance ratio tests (Lo & MacKinlay, 1988) and cointegration tests 
(Engle & Granger; 1987). Moreover, although the majority of the evidence seems 
to be based around the stock market, yet it does suggest that the global financial 
market is not random and asset prices are too volatile to be explained by the 
information. This is the key to our research, if markets are too volatile to be 
efficient then what is explaining the behaviour of volatility in the markets. Another 
key factor to our research as pointed out by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992), the use 
of GARCH models can overcome clustering issues with the variance bound tests. 
A possible issue in the variance bound tests is that market participants seem to 
react differently to negative or positive information. In order to analyse whether 
markets are more efficient during phases of negative or positive shocks, there is a 
requirement to include the asymmetrical/leverage effect in the variance bound test.  
In concluding, the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance theory 
explain different parts of asset pricing. However, as things stand at present, both 
have strong weaknesses. This means in order to fully understand the pricing of 
assets there is still a requirement to use both fundamental theories. Coincidentally, 
the behavioural finance theory could be extended to explain the efficient market 
hypothesis by using the overreaction/underreaction steady state and the key is that 
this is testable. So in essence the behavioural finance theory is a more complete 
and therefore theoretically superior theory of asset pricing. 
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